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The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value 
Auctions: Comment 
By JAMES C. COX, SAMUEL H. DINKIN, AND VERNON L. SMITH* 
The often-cited paper by John H. Kagel and 
Dan Levin (1986) has had a large influence 
on the literature concerned with the properties 
of common value auctions. The low signal, 
public information experimental design that 
they introduced continues to be used by re- 
searchers.' This information environment has 
also been used to interpret data from related 
experiments.2 In addition, both the claimed ad- 
vantages of the low signal, public information 
approach to experiments, and Kagel and 
Levin's original conclusions about public in- 
formation and the winner's curse, have re- 
cently been widely disseminated (Kagel, 1995 
pp. 536-60). 
We explain that their reported Nash equilib- 
rium bid function for the public information 
design is in error, which implies that all of 
their conclusions about the relation between 
the observed and predicted effects of public 
information are non sequiturs because they did 
not follow from existing theory. Our findings 
have implications for bidding theory and data 
analysis. They also have implications for ex- 
perimental methods because they imply that a 
different approach should be used to study the 
effects of public information. 
I. Theoretical Problems with Low 
Signal Public Information 
Kagel and Levin's ( 1986) experiments 
were conducted as follows. The computer 
draws, but does not announce, the common 
value of the auctioned item (xo) from the uni- 
form distribution on [x, x-]. Then the signals, 
xi, i = 1, 2 * - *, n, are independently drawn 
from the uniform distribution on [x0 - 0, x0 + 
0], and each signal is announced privately to 
each of the n bidders.3 In addition, in the low 
signal, public information experiments, the 
lowest of the n signals (XL) is announced pub- 
licly. This approach continues to be advocated 
as follows (Kagel, 1995 p. 540): 
There are, however, several methodo- 
logical advantages to using XL. First, the 
RNNE bid function is readily solved for 
XL, so that the experimenter continues to 
have a benchmark model of fully ra- 
tional behavior against which to com- 
pare actual bidding. Second, XL provides 
a substantial amount of public informa- 
tion about x0 ... , while still maintaining 
an interesting auction. 
We will examine the first claim, about the risk- 
neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bid 
function. 
Kagel and Levin's (1986 p. 902) reported 
RNNE bid function for signals in [x + 8, x - 
6] is 
(1) b(xi, xL, n) 
n-2 xi t XL 
XL + 1 - - L 
n n-2 
2(n -1) L 2(n-1) X" 
* Cox: Department of Economics, 401 McClelland 
Hall, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721; Dinkin: 
Law and Economics Consulting Group, Inc., 2700 East 
Bypass, College Station, TX 77845; Smith: Economic Sci- 
ence Laboratory, 116 McClelland Hall, University of Ar- 
izona, Tucson, AZ 85721. 
'See Kagel (1995); Kagel et al. (1995); Kagel and 
Levin (1996). 
2 See Kagel ( 1995); Levin et al. ( 1996). 
'We use the same notation as Kagel and Levin ( 1986) 
except that we denote the support of the unifornn distri- 
bution of signals as [x,, - 0, x, + 0] in place of their 
denotation as [x,0 - , xo + e]. This change was necessary 
because in some of our proofs we follow standard con- 
vention in using ? to denote small changes in variables. 
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We will demonstrate that (1) is not a Nash 
equilibrium bid function for n 3 bidders, and 
that there does not exist a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium bid function for n =2 bidders, 
when the lowest signal received by the bidders 
is public information. 
A. Counterexample for n 2 3 
Bid function (1) implies that the low signal 
holder always bids an amount equal to her sig- 
nal (XL), which gives her an expected payoff 
of zero for n ! 3.4 We will show that (1) is 
not a Nash equilibrium bid function because, 
if all other bidders bid according to ( 1), then 
there exists an alternative bid function that 
gives the low signal holder positive expected 
payoff. 
Suppose, contrary to equation (1), that the 
low signal holder uses the alternative bid 
function, 
(2) /3(XL, B,n) =xL + 2 2(n -1) 
Note that 
(3) 3(XL, 0, n) b(xL, xL, n), as n 2 2, 
The maximum-likelihood estimate of the 
common value of the auctioned item is (XL + 
xH)12, where x11 is the random value of the 
high signal. Bid function (1) implies that the 
xi-inverse image of 6(XL, 0, n) is XL + 0. 
Therefore, if all other bidders bid according to 
(1) then the expected profit to the low signal 
holder from. bidding according to /3(XL, 0, n) 
is 
(4) E[1r(/6(xl0,n))1 
J'~ fJ [2XL + XH -6(xL, 0, n) 
Xf (XL, XH) dXHdxL 
where f(XL, XH) is the joint density function 
for the high and low signals on the domain of 
Kagel and Levin's bid function (1): 
(5) f( Xi,, XH) 
n(n- 14H20 ) ( XH L)n2 
X I(-xOl49xoO)(XL)I(xL,xoA+)(XH). 
Substitution from (2) and (5) into (4) permits 
us to rewrite E[w(/,8(xL, 0, n))] as 
(6) E[l l(f3(xL, 0, n))] 
lXo x, + 0 r1 
= fxt,- L+6 [  (XH - XL) 
n - --2 
n-2 1 n(n 1) 
2(n -1 ) 
x 
I 
- XL) dxH dxL 
rx + 0 r+0 
f J [ (XH -XL) 
x( XL 2 
n-2 I ( -1 
2(n- 1)0Jfl( 1) 
x XL) dXH dXL- 
Integration of (6) yields 
(7) E[w(/3(xL, 0, n) ) ] 
(!r 1 0 > 0. 
\2/ (n - 1)(n + 1) 
4'With all bidders using bid function (1) and n ? 3, 
the low signal holder never submits the high bid except in 
the degenerate case where all of the signals equal XL. The 
expected common value equals XL in the degenerate case, 
which occurs with probability zero. 
The domain is [x0 - 0, x, + 0]. In equation (5), 
I(t,b)(Z) denotes an indicator function: I(,b) (z) = 1, for 
z C (a, b), and I(,b)(z) = 0, for z 6 (a, b). 
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Therefore, if all of the other bidders bid ac- 
cording to Kagel and Levin's bid function (1), 
then the low signal holder would prefer to re- 
ply with the different bid function, 83(xL, 0, n). 
Therefore, bid function ( 1 ) is not a Nash equi- 
librium bid function.6 
Kagel and Levin focused on the role that 
public information might play in a common 
value auction, particularly its effect on seller's 
revenue and the winner's curse. They tested 
six hypotheses, three of which involved pre- 
dicted effects of public information. They also 
concluded that "... public information ... failed 
to raise revenues by the predicted amount, 
even in markets without a winner's curse" 
(Kagel and Levin, 1986 p. 913). But we have 
shown that the bid function they offer as a 
RNNE bid function for public information (in, 
addition to private signals) is not, in fact, an 
equilibrium bid function. Therefore, the con- 
clusions that they draw about the relation be- 
tween the observed and predicted effects of 
public information do not follow from the bid- 
ding theory in their article. 
The preceding counterexample demon- 
strates that the reported equilibrium bid func- 
tion is wrong, but it does not convey an 
intuition about the nature of the problem. A 
clear understanding of the source of the inher- 
ent problems with the low signal approach is 
needed in order to understand the implications 
of our comment for bidding theory, data anal- 
ysis, and experimental methods. The follow- 
ing nonexistence proof provides the essential 
insight. We present the nonexistence proof for 
the special case of two bidders because of its 
simplicity and clarity. 
B. Nonexistence for n = 2 
We now show, for n = 2 bidders, that there 
does not exist a pure-strategy Nash equilib- 
rium bid function for common value auctions 
in which the low signal is public information. 
Suppose that the low signal holder adopts the 
pure strategy 
(8) bL=f(XL) 
such that f( xL) > XL for some values of XL. 
Let the high signal holder adopt the pure 
strategy 
9 g(xL,xH), forf(xL) < 2XL + 2XH 
h(xL,XH), forf (xL)I XL + XH 
Note that equations (8) and (9) reflect the in- 
formation asymmetry that is implied by having 
the low signal be public information: the high 
signal holder can condition her bid on XL, and 
hence onf( xL), but the low signal holder can- 
not condition his bid on XH. An implication of 
the information asymmetry is that the high sig- 
nal holder can choose 
(10) g(XL, XH) =f(XL) + ? 
and 
(11) h(xL, xH) =f(XL) - s. 
For s > 0 sufficiently small, equations (10) 
and ( 11 ) ensure that the high signal holder has 
a positive expected profit and the low signal 
holder has a negative expected profit. 
In order to have nonnegative expected profit 
from a pure strategy, the low signal holder 
would have to choosef ) such that f( XL) ' 
xL for all xL. The high signal holder could then 
win almost all auctions, and earn positive ex- 
pected profits, by bidding f (xL) + s e(xL, 
xH), fors > 0, where 
(12) 4(XL, XH) = !XL + 2XH f(XL). 
But iff( ) + s 4(, ) is a good reply to 
f ), then f ?') + '/28( , )isabetterreply, 
f( ) + 1/4- * b(, X ) is an even better reply, and 
so on. Thus there does not exist a pure-strategy 
RNNE bid function in this continuous- 
variables model for the low signal, public 
information common value auction. 
6 Of course, if the other bidders knew that the low sig- 
nal holder would bid according to 3(xL,, 0, n), then they 
would prefer not to reply with bid function (1). 
7 There also does not exist a pure-strategy Nash equi- 
librium bid function in a discrete-variables model for the 
experimental design parameters used by Kagel and Levin 
( 1986). The spirit of the proof is similar to the continuous 
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IIe Implications for Common 
Value Auction Research 
The problems that are inherent in the low 
signal, public information environment have 
implications for bidding theory, experimental 
methods, and data analysis. 
A. Implications for Bidding Theory 
The preceding analysis makes clear that the 
theoretical problem inherent in low signal pub- 
lic information is the information asymmetry 
that it creates: the other bidder(s) know as 
much about the low signal holder's valuation 
of the auctioned item as does the low signal 
holder. We have demonstrated that, with this 
information asymmetry, there does not exist a 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium bid function 
for n = 2. The logic of the nonexistence proof 
can be extended to any finite n. Thus, the im- 
plication of our analysis for bidding theory is 
that an equilibrium bid function for the low 
signal, public information environment must 
involve a mixed strategy for the low signal 
holder. But mixed strategies are very difficult 
to apply to data, especially data for individual 
bidders. Thus our analysis can provide meth- 
odological guidance for experimental studies 
in these environments. 
B. Implications for Experimental Methods 
Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber 
(1982) demonstrated that public information 
increases Nash equilibrium bids and the 
seller's revenue in a model with an exoge- 
nously determined number of bidders because 
it reduces item valuation uncertainty. An ex- 
ample of the type of public information that 
they modeled is announcement of an addi- 
tional randomly drawn signal. Unlike the 
Kagel and Levin low signal environment, this 
information environment preserves symmetry 
among the n bidders, each of whom knows his 
own signal and the value of the n + 1 st (pub- 
lic) signal, and therefore it is an environment 
for which there exists a pure-strategy equilib- 
rium bid function. Experimentalists studying 
the effects of public information are well ad- 
vised to adopt such a symmetric approach in 
order to produce data with precise theoretical 
interpretations. The random signal design also 
has other advantages, such as variable sample 
sizes for both public and private information 
signals. Thus, one can use this approach to 
study the effects of more or less public infor- 
mation; for example, one can compare the ef- 
fects of randomly drawn public signal samples 
of size 1 with those of, say, size 5. 
C. Implications for Data Analysis 
Kagel and Levin analyze the incidence of 
the winner's curse in their experiments with 
two measures: (A) profits as a percentage of 
the RNNE (risk-neutral Nash equilibrium) 
prediction; and (B) percentage of high bids 
greater than the expected value of the auc- 
tioned item conditional on the high bidder's 
signal being the highest of n signals. They ap- 
ply these measures to data from both private 
signal and public signal auctions. Neither of 
these measures can be correctly applied to data 
from their public signal auctions. It is already 
clear that measure (A) cannot be applied to 
public signal auction data because their RNNE 
prediction was derived from an incorrect bid 
function. Therefore, the measure (A) results 
reported in Kagel and Levin's Tables 5, 6, and 
7 that involve use of their RNNE prediction 
are incorrect. Measure (B) is also incorrect for 
public signal auctions, as we shall next 
explain. 
Measure (B) is the difference between the 
amount of the winning bid (bw) and the ex- 
pected value of the auctioned item conditional 
on the winning bidder's signal (xi) being the 
highest (XH) of the n signals: bw - E (xo I xi- 
XH).X This is a correct measure for private sig- 
nal auctions but not for public signal auctions. 
case, but requires that s4( ) ? 0.01. For other choices of 
experimental design parameters, a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium bid function could exist in a discrete-variables 
model. 
8 The equation for this measure for the middle part of 
the signal support is reported in Kagel and Levin [1986 
equation (5)]. Equations for all three parts of the signal 
support are reported in Cox et al. [1996 equations ( 12)- 
(17)]. 
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In public signal auctions, each bidder has a 
sample of size two, not one, from the uniform 
distribution of signals. Therefore, his 
maximum-likelihood estimate of the common 
value of the auctioned item is the midpoint be- 
tween the two signals (ji), not the amount of 
his private signal that would be the estimate in 
a private signal auction. The correct measure 
of the conditional expected value of the auc- 
tioned item in public information auctions is 
E (x I| Hi = btH), the expected value of the auc- 
tioned item conditional on one's own midpoint 
being the highest of n midpoints; hence the 
correct measure of the winner's curse is bw - 
F (xoI |ii = PH).9 Therefore, the measure (B) 
results reported in Kagel and Levin's Table 6 
are wrong since they involve an incorrect cal- 
culation of the winner's curse.10 
III Conclusion 
In a widely cited paper, Kagel and Levin 
(1986) reported tests of six hypotheses, three 
concerned with the effects of public informa- 
tion and three concerned with the effects of 
private information on bidding in common 
value auctions (also see Kagel, 1995 pp. 536- 
60). We have shown that the low signal, pub- 
lic information bid function underlying their 
analysis is wrong and, furthermore, that there 
does not exist a pure-strategy equilibrium bid 
function for this information environment. The 
low signal, public information treatment has 
been introduced in other papers and used to 
interpret data in related work. Our theoretical 
analysis implies that this literature needs to be 
critically reexamined. As we have explained, 
the alternative random signal(s), symmetric 
information method for introducing public in- 
formation is better because it is consistent with 
pure-strategy equilibrium bidding theory and 
permits a flexible design in which a researcher 
can vary the size of the public information 
sample. 
Kagel and Levin also concluded that the 
winner's curse was ubiquitous in their pri- 
vate signal auctions with experienced sub- 
jects in which there were more than 3 or 4 
bidders. They based this conclusion on cal- 
culations of the level of bidder profits and 
the number of bids greater than conditional 
expected value. While this is clearly relevant 
information, it does not tell the whole story 
because they did not report significance 
tests. We have conducted t-tests and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov nonparametric tests 
and also used a bootstrapping technique to 
calculate p -values for the winner's curse 
measure that is appropriate for private signal 
auctions, which is bi - E (x, I xi= XH). The 
test results are reported in an Appendix 
available upon request to the authors. All 
three of our test procedures reveal a general 
absence of a significant winner' s curse in ei- 
ther "small" (n c 4) or "large" auctions. 
We conclude that there is some limited evi- 
dence of a winner's curse in the large auc- 
tions but that Kagel and Levin greatly 
overstated their conclusions about it. 
' Complete derivations of conditional expected values 
of this type are contained in Cox and Stephen C. Hayne 
(1998). 
0 A referee, while agreeing that there is a problem with 
the Kagel and Levin bid function for public information 
argues that the correct bid function might strengthen their 
conclusions about seller's revenue. Our point is that their 
conclusions do not follow from the theory in their paper 
and we do not speculate on how a correct theory might 
affect particular conclusions such as the effect of public 
information on seller's revenue. However we do suggest 
that the particular Kagel and Levin asymmetric informa- 
tion approach is problematic in that it requires use of an 
equilibrium involving a mixed strategy. This in turn would 
call for a fundamentally different approach to analyzing 
individual subject data. 
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